

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Crown Copyright documents reproduced by courtesy of The National Archives, London, England.

www.nationalarchives.gov.uk


The National Archives give no warranty as to the accuracy, completeness or fitness for the purpose of the information provided.

Images may be used only for purposes of research, private study or education. Applications for any other use should be made to The National Archives Image Library, Kew, Richmond, Surrey TW9 4DU.

EASTERN

F.O.
371

1947



PALESTINE

File No. 5862

1	2	3	4	5	6

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
Reference:-

FO

371 / 61938

CLOSED
UNTIL

1978

61938

1947

E

E 5862

2

PALESTINE

Registry Number
FROM
No.
Dated
Received in Registry

55862/5862/31
60
Forward
8 July 1947

Memorandum on Comparative Treatment of Arabs and Jews.
Identical to 1149 Saving 18 Fecl.
Transmitting memorandum on the comparative
treatment of the Arabs during disturbances
of 1936-39 and of the Jews during disturbances
of 1945 and subsequent years.

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

A useful paper.

2673. 87
17

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

61938

(Action completed)

J. G. M. 17/4

(Index.)

14/9/48

Next Paper.

1-918

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-

FO 371 / 61938

3

12 clear.

5862
C.S. 725/1.

SAVING.

From the High Commissioner for Palestine.

To the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Date - 19th June, 1947.

No. 149. SAVING. SECRET. *Adh*

Repeated to - Cairo No. 271. SAVING SECRET.

Beirut No. 272. " "

Damascus No. 273 " "

Amman No. 274 " "

Baghdad No. 275 " "

Jedda No. 276 " "

I enclose a "Memorandum on the comparative treatment of the Arabs during the disturbances of 1936-39 and of the Jews during the disturbances of 1945 and subsequent years" which has been prepared in the Secretariat.

2. It is sometimes suggested that if measures similar to those taken during the Arab disturbances of 1936-39 were adopted against Jewish terrorism more success would be achieved than has resulted from the measures actually employed. The purpose of the memorandum is briefly to explain the essential differences between the two situations.

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Reference:-
FO 371 / 61938

4

MEMORANDUM ON THE COMPARATIVE TREATMENT
OF THE ARABS DURING THE DISTURBANCES OF
1936-39 AND OF THE JEWS DURING THE DISTURBANCES OF 1945 AND SUBSEQUENT YEARS.

- - - - -

The Arab disturbances of 1936 and 1937/39 were essentially different in character from the Jewish terrorism of 1945 onwards. The Arab rebellion was a mass movement; until the latter stages of the second disturbances it is roughly true to say that the whole population was either actively participating in the rebellion or openly assisting the rebels. Gangs of all sizes up to 200 persons roamed the countryside as more or less organized and permanent formations; pitched battles lasting for hours (and even in one case for days) were fought with the security forces; the Government writ ceased for months on end to run in large areas of the country; Government services were entirely suspended over most of Arab Palestine; the rebels set up their own courts and established what was in fact a rudimentary government and administration in the areas under their control. It is often overlooked that the Arab disturbances were far wider in scope and greater in intensity than the recent Jewish terrorism.

2. The cardinal feature of Jewish terrorism is that for the most part it has been and is the work of two comparatively small groups (the National Military Organization and the Stern Group), whose activities have been repeatedly repudiated and indeed denounced by the responsible institutions of the Jewish community, and whose attitude to the recognised Jewish leaders is scarcely less envenomed than is their attitude to the mandatory administration. The Jewish Agency and other Jewish bodies, while not prepared to call upon the Yishuv to cooperate with the Government in the suppression of the terrorist groups, are taking certain steps of limited efficacy to circumscribe their activities by, e.g., giving protection to those persons who contribute to their funds under duress and by counter-propaganda particularly among those sections of the Jewish community most susceptible to dissident persuasion. The attitude of the Yishuv itself to the dissidents varies markedly from time to time, but generally it is true to say that it is passive and inert, neither affording the terrorists active assistance nor actively co-operating with the security forces in counter-terrorist operations.

3. To combat the mass insurgency which characterized the Arab disturbances the Palestine Government was driven to adopt the principle of collective responsibility and to make use of collective penalties. The principle of collective responsibility was one to which the Arab community had been accustomed from ancient times; but its application to the Jewish community would have been out of place, not only because of the difference of its social organization, based on the western concept of the individual, but also on account of the very nature of Jewish terrorism, which, as indicated in the preceding paragraph, has been, and continues to be, the work of a dissident minority in which the Jewish community as a whole is not actively implicated. No comparison can usefully be made between the treatment accorded to the Arab and that accorded to Jewish community which ignores the essential difference between the problem with which the Palestine Government was confronted in the years 1936/39 and that with which it has been faced since the end of the war.

/4.....

1	2	3	4	5	6
	1			2	

Reference:-

FO 371 / 61938

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

4. The following tables afford a statistical comparison of the scope of the Arab and Jewish disturbances and of the measures taken by Government for the suppression of each :-

(a) Terrorist incidents.

	<u>Arab disturbances.</u>	<u>Jewish disturbances.</u>
1936	----- (no figures available).	1945. (Records destroyed).
1937.	438.	1946 487.
1938.	5,708.	1947 271. (to 30.4.47).
1939.	3,315.	

(b) Casualties inflicted as a result of terrorist action (excluding terrorists killed or wounded by action of the security forces).

	<u>Arab disturbances.</u>		<u>Jewish disturbances.</u>	
	<u>Killed.</u>	<u>Wounded.</u>	<u>Killed.</u>	<u>Wounded.</u>
1936.	314.	1,337.	1945. 17.	112.
1937.	97.	149.	1946. 119.	241.
1938.	835.	1,204.	1947. 22. (to 30.4.47).	44.
1939.	545.	598.		

(c) Casualties suffered by the security forces as a result of terrorist outrages.

	<u>Arab disturbances.</u>		<u>Jewish disturbances.</u>	
	<u>Killed.</u>	<u>Wounded.</u>	<u>Killed.</u>	<u>Wounded.</u>
1936.	37.	206.	1945. 5.	50.
1937.	19.	13.	1946. 77.	180.
1938.	172.	331.	1947 21. (to 30.4.47).	161.
1939.	37 ^{xl} .	(figure not available).		

(d) Terrorists killed and wounded by action of the security forces.

	<u>Arab disturbances.</u>		<u>Jewish disturbances.</u>	
	<u>Killed.</u>	<u>Wounded.</u>	<u>Killed.</u>	<u>Wounded.</u>
1936.	1,000	(figure not available).	1945. (Records destroyed).	
1937.	150.		1946. 15.	17.
1938.	1,000	(figure not available).	1947 5. (to 30.4.47).	4.
1939.	(no figures available).			

^{xl}. This figure relates only to British and Palestinian police. (Figure for military killed not available).

/(e).....

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Reference:-

FO

371 / 61938

1
2
3
4
5
6

(e) Persons deported from Palestine for complicity in terrorism.

Arab disturbances.	Jewish disturbances (to 30.4.47.)
5	444.

(f) Terrorists and suspected terrorists detained under emergency powers.

Arab disturbances.	Jewish disturbances.
1936. (figures not available).	1945. 512.
1937. 816.	1946. 1,204.
1938. 2,463.	1947. 715.
1939. 9,343.	(to 30.4.47).
(These figures relate to Arabs only).	(These figures relate to Jews only).

(g) Persons executed in pursuance of military court sentences.

Arab disturbances.	Jewish disturbances.
1936. Nil.	1945. ---
1937. 2 x2	1946. ---
1938. 53.	1947. 4 x3.
1939. 53.	
(These figures relate to Arabs only).	

5. The comparison would not be complete were mention omitted of two forms of collective penalty imposed in the Arab rebellion which have not been used (x4) in the disturbances of 1945/47. These comprised :

(a) punitive demolition of buildings.

No record exists of the number of buildings so destroyed; the power to appropriate (and subsequently demolish) property conferred by regulation 19B of the Emergency Regulations 1936 was vested originally in district commissioners and assistant district commissioners and subsequently in military commanders and was exercised in accordance with the exigencies of the local situation. It is commonly said that some 2,000 Arab buildings were demolished for punitive reasons between 1936 and 1940. These were for the most part small village dwellings of mud or rough stone of comparatively little pecuniary value; to have employed a similar form of punishment in Jewish areas would have involved the destruction of substantially built edifices - blocks of flats and corporation buildings - of vastly greater value, and would have been a penalty of incomparably greater severity.

(b) imposition of collective fines and punitive police.

The records of these have been destroyed. A substantial part of the fines imposed was never collected and was subsequently written-off.

- x2. Figure of 3 given at page 16 of the Report to the League of Nations for 1937 is incorrect.
- x3. Plus two prisoners under sentence of death who committed suicide in prison.
- x4. A fine of £500 was imposed on the Jewish settlement of Givat Shaul following the attempt on the life of Sir Harold MacMichael. This was collected in full.

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Reference: **FO** 371 / 61938

1
2
3
4
5
6

2

E

E 5918

7

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number } E5918/5862/31
TELEGRAM FROM

No. *to R. G. ...*

Dated *Cairo*
Received in Registry } 75 Savoy
2 July

*Comparative treatment of Arabs and Jews
Refer Paris (149 Savoy (55862/5862/31)
document on it under ref.
Hope that memo will not be transmitted
to public in Arab countries, which would
if it would have had effect.*

Last Paper.

5-862.

(Minutes.)

References.

*See E 5862. There is no ^{suggestion} ~~possibility~~
then that any publicity is to be
given to the memorandum in question
beyond C.O.
H. B. ...*

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

* *Del. Cairo.
87 Savoy.
11 July
H. Buckleman C.O.
July 14
* 8) H. Watson C.O.
(Spec. Pass)
11 July*

I think we should so inform Cairo.

*PL
9/1
Tel. ...
H.B. 197*

(Action completed.)

(Index)

*1/26/48
1/29/48*

Next Paper.

1
2
3
4
5
6

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
Reference: FO 371 / 61938

E 5918

En Clair

7 DEPARTMENTAL NO. 2.


FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R.I. Campbell R. 12.25 p.m. 5th July 1947
No. 75 Saving

2nd July 1947

Repeated to Bagdad No. 49)
Beirut No. 50)
Damascus No. 43)
Jerusalem No. 39)
Amman No. 67)
Jedda No. 52)

Saving



c c c c c

SECRET

Jerusalem telegram No. 149 Saving of June 19th to
Secretary of State for the Colonies.

I hope that this memorandum is meant for use among ourselves and not for use among the public in Arab countries where parts of it would have bad effects. For instance, the Arabs would not appreciate paragraph 3 which seeks to justify collective measures against the Arab community and the absence of such action against the Jews. The Arabs would also not appreciate paragraph 5 (a) which would be interpreted as meaning that it was justifiable to destroy the humble dwellings of the Arab peasants because they were of little value while it was not justifiable to destroy Jewish edifices which were much more valuable.

2. Incidentally the Head of the King's Cabinet, in the course of conversation with me, emphasised the fact that during the Arab Revolt any attacks on our troops invoked reprisals on the non-combatant population. Arabs were used as minesweepers and there was no hesitation in execution of Arabs caught in acts of violence or carrying arms. When I pointed out to His Excellency the difficulty of dealing with terrorists and terrorist tactics, he said that he would guarantee to do it in six weeks - the terrorists could not do what they did unless at least sheltered by other Jews.

3. I should have thought that the best line to take was that indicated in the first two paragraphs of Jerusalem memorandum, that is, the essential difference between a general armed revolt and terrorist activities, without going into the details of this memorandum which, with respect, I do not think will carry conviction in Arab and Moslem countries.

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Reference:-

FO

371 / 61938

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. *E 5918/5862/31*

F. O.,

9

OUT FILE

194

Despatched

M.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft.

Telegram. *Saving*

No. *Cairo*

(Date) *8/28/41*

Repeat to:—
Saving

Bagdad 34 SAV ✓

Beirut 37 SAV ✓

Damascus 44 SAV ✓

Jedda 18 SAV ✓

Amman 20 SAV ✓

Jerusalem

En Clair.

~~Code~~

~~Cypher~~

Distribution:—

Depl. no. 2

Copies to:—

C.O. (Mr. Mathison)

Your telegram no. 75 Saving

I understand that there is no intention of making public the memorandum to which you refer.

H.B. 107/7

1
2
3
4
5
6

Reference:—

FO

371 /

61938

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

OUTWARD TELEGRAM ^{OUT FILE}

10
End

E.5918/5862/31.

[En clair by
Confidential Bag]

DEPARTMENTAL NO.2.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No.82. Saving.

11th July, 1947.

Repeated to Bagdad No.34
Beirut No.37
Damascus No.24
Jedda No.18
Amman No.20
Jerusalem

} Saving.

Your telegram No.75 Saving.

I understand that there is no intention of
making public the memorandum to which you refer.

1	2	3	4	5	6
		1		2	

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Reference:-

FO 371 / 61938